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tion in this process is a purely advisory one,1 was apparently per-
mitted to do the same thing.
The case seems to apply a new concept of finality to board de-
cisions, making them irreversible even by the boards themselves
without new evidence. While this seems a radical departure from
the laissez faire attitude with which the courts have viewed the con-
scription process in the past,20 the burden placed on the boards does
not seem an unreasonable one. It is a basic principle that a defer-
ment is to be granted only when, under the unusual circumstances
present, the registrant clearly establishes his right to it.21  If it is
conceded that there are such circumstances present, it seems only
reasonable that the same facts cannot support a reversal by which
the board denies the deferment.
There is, however, the danger that the boards would react to
such an imposition of finality by arbitrarily refusing to grant a de-
ferment in the first instance, thus securing for themselves the advan-
tage of the Department of Justice's recommendation before making
a final decision.22  In that event, the effect would be precisely what
the courts have tried to avoid-an abdication by the board of its
function, permitting the Department of Justice alone to all but classify
the registrants.
ANTITRUST- RELEVANT MARKET OF CHAMPIONSHIP BOUTS
DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL PROFESSIONAL BOXING CONTESTS.-Defen-
dants were engaged in the promotion of professional boxing matches
in the United States. The Government in bringing this action al-
leged violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act I in that
19 Exec. Order No. 10363, 17 Fed. Reg. 5456 (1952).
20 For a review of the limitations placed on judicial review of draft board
decisions, see concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter, Estep v. United
States, 327 U.S. 114, 134 (1946).
21 "It must be observed ... that we are dealing with an exemption, and
that under familiar rules of statutory construction, the appellant must bring
himself clearly within the exempted class." Rase v. United States, 129 F.2d
204, 207 (1942).
22 The Department of Justice inquiry is made only when a registrant ap-
peals from a denial of the conscientious objector classification. Thus, where
a board desires a more thorough exposition of the facts before making a final
decision, the simple expedient would be to refuse the classification and allow
the registrant to appeal.
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952).
"SECTION 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal ....
"SEc. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
RECENT DECISIONS
defendants, by combination and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint
of trade and commerce in the promotion, broadcasting and televis-
ing of professional world championship boxing contests, had effected
a conspiracy to monopolize and did achieve the subsequent monopo-
lization of those activities. The Supreme Court held that the dis-
trict court was not clearly erroneous 2 in finding the relevant market
to be professional championship boxing as opposed to all professional
boxing events and had not abused its discretion in granting relief,
which included dissolution of the two corporate appellants, directing
divestiture of certain stock owned by the individual appellants and
granting injunctive relief designed to open up the market in the busi-
ness of promoting professional world championship boxing matches.
International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
For many years professional boxing was thought to be immune
from the antitrust laws.3 In 1955 the Supreme Court ruled otherwise
in reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint in the prin-
cipal case. 4 The Court then stated that:
A boxing match-like the showing of a motion picture ... or the performance
of a vaudeville act . . . "is of course a local affair." But that fact alone
does not bar application of the Sherman Act to a business based on the pro-
motion of such matches, if the business is itself engaged in interstate commerce
or if the business imposes illegal restraints on interstate commerce.5
The stage was thus set for other professional sports to be subjected
to the antitrust laws. 6
The principal case is the culmination of an action begun in 1952.
It raises the important question of definition of "relevant market," 7
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. ..."
2FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a), provides that: "Findings of fact shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the op-
portunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses."
3 Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) held that
baseball was not subject to the antitrust laws. This case was generally re-
garded as authority for the immunity of all professional sports. See O'Dea,
Professional Sports and the Anti-Trust Laws, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 18, 22 (1957).
In Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953) baseball once again
was assured of its immunity.
4 United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
Id. at 241.
6 See O'Dea, Professional Sports and the Anti-Trust Laws, 9 HASTINGS
L.J. 18, 35 (1957).
, In order to determine whether monopoly power for purposes of § 2
exists, a definition of the market within which it is to be measured is essential,
for the distinction between competition and monopoly turns on power in a
relevant market, i.e., the market within which the monopoly is alleged to
operate. Although the word "market" does not appear in the statute, it is
a necessary element of the concepts of monopoly and certain restraints, of
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in that the "appellants launch a vigorous attack on the finding [of the
district court] that the relevant market was the promotion of chain-
pionship boxing contests in contrast to all professional boxing
events." 8 A cursory review of the concept of relevant market as
applied in the past is essential to place this case in proper perspective.
A convenient means of approaching the relevant market concept,
as promulgated by the Supreme Court, is best achieved by an exam-
ination of the leading cases prior to United States v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co.,9 hereinafter referred to as the Cellophane case.
Prior to the Cellophane case most of the decisions were concerned
primarily with attempts, combinations and conspiracies to monopolize
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.'0 In other decisions,
where the charge was realized monopolization, the courts considered
the uses, qualities and prices of each product to be included in the
relevant market." The practical application of the relevant market
doctrine prior to Cellophane is best illustrated in United States v.
Corn Prods. Ref. Co. 12 The company was charged with being a com-
bination that had illegally monopolized trade in starch glucose and
related end products. It contended that the relevant market should
encompass various competing products. Judge Learned Hand, in
determining the market issue with reference to substitute products,
held starch syrup made from corn to be separate and distinct from
starch syrup made from other raw material.
[W]here the two commodities compared are indistinguishable in use, [a
monopoly] is limited by the actual differential in the cost of production between
them. Such a monopoly is therefore only a limited one, but within the limits
it may be a true one.13
The jurist explained that since the products are physically distin-
guishable (though indistinguishable in use) their inclusion would
have to depend upon comparative costs of production.1 4  Once the
trade upon which the statute rests. See Arr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST
REP. 44 (1955).
8 International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249 (1959).
9351 U.S. 377 (1956).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949) ; United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948) ; American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) ; Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311
(1928).
11 See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 176 (1931) ; United States
v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 Fed. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal disnissed,
249 U.S. 621 (1918). If the products had virtually identical end uses, qualities
and prices, they would be included in the same market. See Note, 54 COLUNI. L.
REV. 580 (1954).
12234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1918).
13 Id. at 975.
14 Id. at 976. The court went on to say that "... sago, potato, corn, and
wheat starches [are not to be considered a part of the relevant market] . ..
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market is defined, percentage share of the market must be considered
in determining whether defendants charged with a realized monopoly
had actual monopoly power.15
The Cellophane case indicated a departure from the established
approach in dealing with relevant market. Whfereas, in the past, a
slight differentiation in uses, qualities and prices would exclude a
product from the market, in the Cellophane case flexible packaging
materials having a wide range of uses, qualities and prices were in-
cluded in the same market. 16 Since the courts, before Cellophane, had
included in the same market only products that were fungible and
selling at the same price, it was argued that cellophane should have
been excluded from the flexible packaging materials market. This
argument was rejected by the Court in declaring that
* . .where there are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their
purposes, illegal monopoly does not exist merely because the product said to
be monopolized differs from others. If it were not so, only physically identical
products would be a part of the market.... What is called for is an appraisal
of the "cross-elasticity" of demand in the trade .... In considering what is
the relevant market for determining the control of price and competition, no
more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably inter-
changeable by consumers for the same purposes make up that "part of the
trade or commerce," monopolization of which may be illegal.17
The Court distinguished prior decisions by indicating that the earlier
cases were concerned with combinations, conspiracies or attempts to
monopolize in violation of section 2, whereas the Cellophane case was
concerned with realized monopolization. The Government sought to
because those have both a distinguishable use . . . and a higher cost of
production." Ibid.
15 Judicial searches for monopoly power generally start with the primary
fact of relative size, that is, the percentage of supply controlled. Size is of
course an indication of monopoly power. See United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), wherein the court, sitting as a
court of last resort because of the non-availability of a quorum in the Supreme
Court, remarked that 90% of supply "is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is
doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four per cent would be enough; and certainly
thirty-three per cent is not." Id. at 424.. The apparent force of this comment
was qualified in a statement which applies equally to §1 and § 2 cases, in
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). The Supreme
Court in that case said: "We do not undertake to prescribe any set of
percentage figures by which to measure the reasonableness of a corporation's
enlargement of its activities by the purchase of the assets of a competitor.
The relative effect of percentage command of a market varies with the setting
in which that factor is placed." Id. at 527-28.
16 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 64
(D. Del. 1953). The trial court compared the use, qualities and price of
cellophane with other packaging materials and found that in qualities and
price there was a wide disparity among the various flexible packaging
materials.
"1 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377, 394
(1956).
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take the case out of the relevant market area by contending that the
prohibitions of section 2 have often been extended to producers of
single products and to businesses of limited scope. This attempt was
rejected because Cellophane, being concerned with realized monopo-
lization, presented relevant market as the critical issue.i s
The question is thus presented as to the effect of the instant case
upon Cellophane in so far as relevant market is concerned. Defen-
dants maintained that if Cellophane is the law the relevant market
must be all of professional boxing as opposed to the championship
boxing market as urged by the Government. 19 The Court, in reject-
is Id. at 395-96 n. 23 (1956). Where the would-be monopolist has conspired
or attempted to bring under his control a particular area of trade, his own
conduct constitutes an appraisal that, if he can attain this end, outside com-
petitive forces will not negate the exercise of monopolistic power. But specific
intent of this kind is not an element of the offense of realized monopolization,
which lacks this guidepost furnrished by the defendant's own conduct. An
interesting aspect of the instant case was the Government's attempt once
again to remove the case from the scope of the relevant market, based upon
the Court's remarks in the Cellophane decision. The Government maintained
that "Since the Court regarded these precedents [as cited in Cellophane] as
not applicable when the sole issue was monopolization, it necessarily held
that there is a distinction between monopolization, on the one hand, and
conspiracy or attempt to monopolize, on the other hand, as to the market
determinative of possession of monopoly power. The instant case, where
-both conspiracy to monopolize and monopolization have been found, is there-
fore governed by the decisions applying Section 2 to single products or
businesses of limited scope." Brief for Respondent, pp. 37-38, International
Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959). The Supreme Court
ignored this argument for what would seem to be the reason urged by the
appellants: "The plaintiff's concept of a variable market, if adopted, would
make a meaningless formality out of the market test and automatically convert
section 1 restraints into section 2 conspiracies or attempts to monopolize. The
attempt to monopolize and conspiracy cases enjoin defendants from engaging
in previously proved efforts to obtain powers which would eventually lead to
monopolization. The actual point at which monopolization would be achieved
is therefore unimportant. Here, however, the District Court decided that
the defendants not only aspired to but actually succeeded in monopolization,
and it bottomed its decree on this conclusion. Such a conclusion of necessity
required an evaluation of the relevant market." Reply Brief for Appellants,
p. 6, International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S 242 (1959).
19"The nature and use of boxing programs show that championship
programs taken alone do not meet the test of a separate market expressed
in United States v. du Pont & Co .... as having 'sufficient peculiar character-
istics and uses to constitute them products sufficiently distinct from all other'
boxing programs. ...
"The products in this case are identical-professional boxing programs
presenting a number of contests, each of which has two boxers in a ring with
a referee. They fight under the same rules, all under state or local regulation
and protection, and they are presented to an audience personally present or
listening or viewing through radio or television broadcasts and motion picture
films. . . .This physical identity of the products here would seem necessarily
to put them in one and the same market." Brief for Appellants, p. 14,
International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
[ VOL. 33
RECENT DECISIONS
ing the defendants' position, used the language of Cellophane, holding
that in applying the Cellophane test,
the "market" . . . will vary with the part of commerce under consideration.
The tests are constant. That market is composed of products that have reason-
able interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced-price,
use and qualitiet considered.20
The Court went on to say that the lower court had found that there
existed a separate identifiable market for championship boxing con-
tests and in view of these findings "we cannot say that the lower
court was 'clearly erroneous' in concluding that nonchampionship
fights are not 'reasonably interchangeable for the same purpose' as
championship contests." 21 The evidence offefed by the Government
consisted of comparisons of average dollar income, the average audi-
ence ratings and testimony of representatives of the broadcasting,
motion picture and advertising industries to the effect that a special
demand exists among radio broadcasting and telecasting industries
for rights to championship contests.22  It should be borne 'in mind
that in the Cellophane case the facts that cellophane cost the public
two to three times more than most of the other products, that the
consumer-cost of many of the other products in the market ranged
from one-seventh to one-half less than cellophane, that the average
dollar volume of cellophane sales was higher than other flexible wrap-
pings, and that du Pont produced 75 per cent of all cellophane, were
insufficient to differentiate cellophane from the rest of the market of
flexible wrapping materials. 23
In International Boxing Club, the Court, while applying the
Cellophane test of the relevant market, stated that "the case which
most squarely governs this case is United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948)."24 The dissent in Cellophane
20 International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 250 (1959).
21 Id. at 251.
22"[T]he average revenue from all sources for appellants' championship
bouts was $154,000, compared to $40,000 for their nonchampionship programs.
'Nielsen' [average audience] ratings over a two-and-one-half-year period
were 74.9% for appellants' championship contests, and 57.7% for their non-
championship programs. . . ." Id. at 250.
23 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
24 International Boxing Club v. United States, supra note 19, at" 251. In
Paramount the district court had found that the five major defendants did
not have a purpose to achieve a national monopoly in the exhibition of motion
pictures and that they did not, collectively or individually, have a monopoly
of exhibition. The Supreme Court held these findings deficient in that there
was no finding as to the presence or absence of monopoly in the first-run
field for the entire country, in the first-rum field in the 92 largest cities of
the country, or in the first-ran field in separate localities. The Paramount
Court pointed out that the first-run field, which constitutes the cream of the
exhibition business, was the core of that case. The cause was remanded to
the district court for the purpose, among other things, of making the findings
which had not been made, and which could be of importance only if mo-
1959 ]
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maintained that the majority had in effect disregarded Paramount
Pictures and other cases in their handling of 'the market-definition
problem, and thus equated reasonable interchangeability with the
theory of interindustry competition. 25 In the instant case, while
the defendants did not explicitly rely on the equation, they did suggest
that even the business of promoting all boxing contests cannot be
monopolized since boxing is only a part of the entertainment field
generally.26 Professor Turner, in discussing the Cellophane case,
observes:
It is difficult to determine whether or to what extent the majority and the
dissenters were disagreeing on the law to be applied in defining the market
with regard to substitutes, because it is not entirely clear just what legal
tests each opinion employed. The majority's formula of "reasonable inter-
changeability . . . price, use and qualities considered," does not by its terms
permit consideration of differences in cost of production. 27
Taken on its face, the Cellophane test would clearly differ from
that followed in Paramount in that it might permit a finding of no
monopoly whenever a producer, though having a cost advantage
sufficient to exclude competition, chose to price his product high
enough to create a high "cross-elasticity of demand" and thus permit
substitutes to compete., Professor Turner is of the opinion that this
interpretation is doubtful. 28 His view would seem to be substantiated
in light of the Court's reaffirmation of the Paramount case while
applying a conservative interpretation of the Cellophane test.
It would appear that the instant case should serve to quiet
the fears that Cellophane may have caused among advocates of a
strong antitrust policy. If Cellophane was thought to have opened
the door to easy avoidance of our antitrust laws, International Boxing
Club would seem to have the effect of closing it.
Another interesting aspect of the principal case is the relief
ordered by the court. Aside from injunctive relief designed to
nopolization in the limited fields indicated would violate § 2 of the act.
The district court then found that the five major defendants had power to
exclude competition in the markets constituting first-rum exhibition in the
country's 92 largest cities. 85 F. Supp. 881, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
25 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 423
(1956) (dissenting opinion). The dissent contended that the majority's position
would do away with Paramount: "The majority approach would apparently
enable a monopolist of motion picture exhibition to avoid Sherman Act con-
sequences by showing that motion pictures compete in substantial measure with
legitimate theatre, television, radio, sporting events and other forms of enter-
tainment. Here, too, 'shifts of business' undoubtedly accompany fluctuations
in price and 'there are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their
purposes.'" Ibid.
26 See Brief for Defendants, pp. 11-12, International Boxing Club v. United
States, 150 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
27 Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REv.
281, 302 (1956).
28 Ibid.
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open up the aforementioned market, the court directed divestiture
of certain stock owned by the individual appellants and directed
dissolution of the two corporate appellants. 29
Injunctions constitute the primary equity remedy in antitrust
cases. Other devices which may be utilized include divorcement,
dissolution and divestiture.30 Since the end to be served in an
equity suit is not punishment of past transgressions, but the opening
of a market that has been closed by the defendant's illegal restraints,
these devices will not be used indiscriminately "without regard to
the type of violation or whether other effective methods, less harsh,
are available." 31 In the sixty years of Sherman Act history, decrees
requiring divorcement, divestiture or dissolution have been entered
in only 24 litigated cases.32  Of course there were divestiture pro-
visions in numerous consent decrees. In the instant case the Court
reiterates :
[T]he yardstick which the trial court should apply in monopolization cases is
well stated by the Court in Schine Chain Theatres v. United States ... The
decree should (1) put "an end to the combination or conspiracy when that is
itself the violation"; (2) deprive "the antitrust defendants of the benefits of
their conspiracy"; and (3) "break up or render impotent the monopoly power
which violates the act." 33
In International Boxing Club the majority sustained the finding
of the district court that the "great evil" was caused by the combin-
ation of Norris and Wirtz, stockholders of the defendant corporation,
with Madison Square Garden, and the "only effective means at
29 See International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 253-63
(1959). The divestiture ordered in this case consisted of compelling Norris
and Wirtz to sell their stock in Madison Square Garden within five years to
court-approved persons under court-approved conditions. Pending such sale
the stock is to be held by court-appointed trustees who are given all rights in
the stock, except retention of cash dividends and right to vote on a sale of
assets or liquidation or merger without court instruction.
30 Divestiture refers to situations where the defendants are required to
divest themselves of property, securities or other assets. Divorcement is used
to indicate the effect of a decree where certain types of divestiture are ordered.
The term dissolution is generally used to refer to any situation where the
dissolving of an allegedly illegal combination or association is involved, in-
cluding the use of divestiture and divorcement as methods of achieving that
end. See Oppenheim, Divestiture as a Remedy Under the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 19 GEo. WAsH. L. Rzv. 119, 120 (1950).
31 Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 603 (1951),
where the Court said: "There are no specific statutory provisions authorizing
courts to employ the harsh remedy of divestiture in civil proceedings to restrain
violations of the Sherman Act. Fines and imprisonment may follow criminal
convictions . . . and divestiture of property has been used in decrees, not as
punishment, but to assure effective enforcement of the laws against restraint of
trade." Id. at 602-03. See also International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).32 Arr'y GEr. NAT'L Corim. ANTITRUST Rep. 354 (1955).
33 International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 253 (1959).
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hand by which competition in championship events might be re-
stored" 34 is through divestiture. The dissent took strong issue
with this point, contending that the five-year trusteeship of the stock
would have the effect of removing Norris and Wirtz from control
over the operations of Madison Square Garden.3 5 The majority did
however recognize the fact that the order of divestiture went far
beyond the Vubject matter of the action. It permanently removed
Norris and Wirtz from all interest in the Garden, in which over
90 per cent of the activities are entirely unrelated to professional
boxing. 36
In Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,37 decided over
ten years ago, the Court, in affirming the granting of divestiture by
the district court, distinguished between physical properties acquired
lawfully and those acquired unlawfully. In the instant case, unlike
the situation in Schine Theatres, Madison Square Garden was law-
fully acquired. The Court, in refusing to make the distinction again,
said "it may be that the stock in Madison Square Garden was not
the fruit of the conspiracy; but even if lawfully acquired it may be
utilized as part of the conspiracy to effect its ends." 3
What had appeared to be a growing conservative trend toward
denying divestiture relief seems, by virtue of the principal case, to
be heading in the opposite direction.39 The dissent took notice of
this in stating:
Unless past pronouncements of this Court cautioning against the indiscriminate
use of divestiture as a remedy in antitrust cases, see Timken Co. v. United
States . . . are to be taken less seriously than they should be, it seems to me
34. Id. at 258.
3 5 Mr. Justice Harlan speaking for the minority said: "Indeed the record
can be read as indicating the court's belief that the five-year trusteeship of the
stock, though designed to alleviate some of the hardships of a forced sale,
would at the same time effectively remove Norris and Wirtz from control
over the Garden's affairs and therefore in conjunction with the other provisions
of the decree result in restoring competitive conditions, whether or not the
correlative requirement of sale was carried out within the five-year period."
1d. at 265.
36 The Court stated that "sometimes 'relief, to be effective, must go beyond
the narrow limits of the proven violation'. . . . [However] when this sort of
relief is granted, we must of course be especially wary lest the trial court
overstep the correspondingly narrower limits of its discretion ... " Id. at
262.
.7 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
38 International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 256 (1959).
39 In 1951 Professor Adams said that "the case of [Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States] .. . is significant because it indicates a growing trend
against the liberal granting of divestiture by the Supreme Court. Moreover,
the case is important because it demonstrates ... [that] the Court can refuse-
and, in the foreseeable future, is likely to refuse-divestiture in any manner
or form." Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic
Victories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1, 15 (1951).
[ VOL. 33
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that the Court has too lightly given approval to the use of that drastic measure
here.40
In the light of International Boxing Club, it may be appropriate
that the words of Judge Wyzanski be reiterated:
In the anti-trust field the courts have been accorded, by common consent, an
authority they have in no other branch of enacted law. . . .They would not
have been given, or allowed to keep, such authority in the anti-trust field ...
if courts were in the habit of proceeding with the surgical ruthlessness that
might commend itself to those seeking absolute assurance that there will be
workable competition....41
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-COURTS-MARTIAL-TRIAL OF CIVILIAN
EMPLOYEE OF THE MILITARY OVERSEAS BY COURT-MARTIAL HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. - Defendant, a civilian employee of the Air
Force, was convicted of larceny by a military court-martial in
Morocco. In granting the defendant's petition for habeas corpus
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cifcuit held that
article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military JusticeI could not
constitutionally bring civilian employees of the Armed Forces, sta-
tioned overseas during peacetime, under military jurisdiction.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927 (D.C.
Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U. S. 904 (1959).
Article 2(11) provides for military jurisdiction over "all per-
sons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces
[overseas] .... ,, 2 The constitutionality of article 2(11) was passed
upon by the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert.3 In that case the
Court did not deny the exercise of military jurisdiction over accom-
panying civilians during time of war,* but held article 2(11) un-
constitutional insofar as it applied to civilian dependents (by impli-
cation "persons accompanying") in capital cases during peacetime.
The invalidation followed from the Court's holding that the civilian
dependent was entitled to a jury trial as a matter of constitutional
4"International Boxing Club v. United States, supra note 36, at 265.
41 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
1 10 U.S.C. §802(11) (Supp. V, 1958).
2 Ibid.
3354 U.S. 1 (1957), reversing on rehearing 351 U.S. 487 (1956), and
Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
4 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (as exercise of governmental
"War Powers"); accord, Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.
1945), cert. dismissed as moot, 328 U.S. 822 (1946); Hines v. Mikell, 259
Fed. 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645 (1919).
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